Constitutional Law—Balancing Test in Durational Residence Equal Protection Analysis—Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981) by Lewis, E. Thaddeus
Washington Law Review 
Volume 56 Number 4 
11-1-1981 
Constitutional Law—Balancing Test in Durational Residence Equal 
Protection Analysis—Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 
1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981) 
E. Thaddeus Lewis 





 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
E. T. Lewis, Recent Developments, Constitutional Law—Balancing Test in Durational Residence Equal 
Protection Analysis—Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 
(1981), 56 Wash. L. Rev. 763 (1981). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol56/iss4/15 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BALANCING TEST IN DURATIONAL RESI-
DENCE EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSiS-Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d
448 (Alaska 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981).
In April of 1980 Alaska's legislature passed the permanent fund in-
come distribution statute' and the income tax exemption statute.2 The first
1. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21 (1980) (codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.23.010-.100 (Supp.
1980)). The pertinent sections of the statute read:
Sec. 43.23.010. ELIGIBILITY FOR PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND. (a) An individual
who is eligible under (b) of this section is entitled to one permanent fund dividend for each full
year that the individual is a state resident after January 1, 1959.
(b) For each year, an individual is eligible to receive payment of the permanent fund divi-
dends for which he is entitled under this section if he
(1) is at least 18 years of age; and
(2) is a state resident during all or part of the year for which the permanent fund dividend is
paid.
(c) To determine the number of permanent fund dividends to which an individual is entitled
under (a) of this section, a year in which the individual is a state resident for less than 12 months
may not be counted, but a payment of a permanent fund dividend may be made for that year
under (f) of this section.
(f) If an individual who is eligible under (b) of this section was a state resident for less than 12
months during the year immediately preceding the year in which a-claim is filed, the individual
is entitled to payment of one prorated dividend. If that individual is also entitled to dividends
under (a) of this section based on previous years as a state resident, he is entitled to receive a
prorated payment for the total number of permanent fund dividends to which he is entitled under
(a) of this section. A prorated dividend or prorated payment under this subsection shall be pro-
rated on the basis of the number of months that the individual was a state resident during the year
immediately preceding the year in which the dividend is claimed.
Sec. 43.23.030. AMOUNT OF DIVIDEND. By December I of each year the commissioner
shall give public notice of the value of each permanent fund dividend to be paid in the following
year. The commissioner shall determine the value of a permanent fund dividend by
(I) determining the amount of income of the Alaska permanent fund transferred to the divi-
dend fund under AS 43.23.050(b) in the current year, less the amount, if any, to be repaid in the
current year to the general fund under AS 43.23.050(c);
(2) determining the number of permanent fund dividends paid during the current year; and
(3) dividing the amount determined in (1) of this section by the amount determined in (2) of
this section.
Sec. 43.23.100. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter,
(I) "Alaska permanent fund" means the fund established by art. IX, § 15, of the state consti-
tution;
(6) "permanent fund dividend" means a right to receive a payment of money from the divi-
dend fund;
(7) "state resident" means an individual who is physically present in the state with the intent
to remain permanently in the state or, if he is not physically present in the state, intends to return
to the state and he is absent for the following reasons:
(A) vocational, professional or other special education for which a comparable program was
not reasonably available in the state,
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statute provides for an annual distribution of the interest income on the
state permanent fund, 3 which consists of one-half of the oil royalties and
lease income received by the state. State residents 4 would receive one
dividend payment each year based on the current year's dividend rate5
multiplied by the number of full years of residency in Alaska since 1959,6 the
year Alaska became a state. 7 Alaska residents who have lived in the state
less than a full year in the dividend year would receive a prorated divi-




(E) service in Congress, or
(F) other reasons which the commissioner may establish by regulation under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (AS 44.62);
(8) "year" means a calendar year.
2. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 22 (1980) (repealed 1980) provides:
INDIVIDUAL TAX EXEMPTIONS. (a) If an individual filed an Alaska net income tax
return and reported gross income earned from sources in the state for three or more years preced-
ing the tax year for which an exemption is claimed under this section, the income of that individ-
ual is exempt from taxation under this chapter in each succeeding tax year.
(b) An individual is exempt from payment of two-thirds of the net income tax levied under
this chapter if the individual filed an Alaska net income tax return and reported gross income
earned from sources in the state for two tax years preceding the tax year for which an exemption
is claimed under this section.
(c) An individual is exempt from payment of one-third of the net income tax levied under this
chapter if the individual filed an Alaska net income tax return and reported gross income earned
from sources in the state for one tax year preceding the tax year for which an exemption is
claimed under this section.
3. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15 provides:
ALASKA PERMANENT FUND. At least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals,
royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses received
by the State shall be placed in a permanent fund, the principal of which shall be used only for
those income-producing investments specifically designated by law as eligible for permanent
fund investments. All income from the permanent fund shall be deposited in the general fund
unless otherwise provided by law.
Alaska's Legislature raised the amount of rentals, royalties, proceeds, payments and bonuses to be
placed in the permanent fund to 50 percent. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 18, § 5 (1980) (codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.010 (Supp. 1980)).
4. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.100(7) (Supp. 1980).
5. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.030 (Supp. 1980).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.010 (Supp. 1980).
7. This is not the only Alaska statute that attempts to keep Alaska residents from leaving the
state. The Alaska longevity bonus statute, ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.45.010-.170 (1979), provides for
payment of $1,800 per year to Alaska residents who are 65 years of age or older and 25-year resi-
dents. (The law also states that only those residents who lived in the state prior to or on January 3,
1959 are eligible for payments.) The Pioneer's Home statute, ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.25.010-. 100
(1979), provides for admission to state supported retirement homes for 15-year residents who either
are needy, or can provide compensation to the state on a daily basis for their care (the daily rate is
relatively low). Both statutes are designed to help Alaskans living on low and fixed incomes to main-
tain their residency in the state. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.45.170 (1979).
8. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.010(f) (Supp. 1980).
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emption statute eliminates individual state income tax liability on a gradu-
ated basis depending on the number of state income tax returns filed by
the individual in the three years prior to the filing year in question. 9
Ronald and Patricia Zobel, two-year residents of Alaska, successfully
challenged both plans in Alaska's superior court on the ground that they
violated the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska constitution. 10 The
Alaska Supreme Court, ruling separately on the statutes, affirmed the
lower court on the income tax exemption statute in Williams v. Zobel
(Zobel 1)11 but reversed and upheld the permanent fund income distribu-
tion statute in Williams v. Zobel (Zobe 11)12. In both plurality opinions,
the Alaska court applied a balancing test it had developed for state equal
protection analysis. 13 The court further held, in Zobel 11, that the perma-
nent fund income distribution statute did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 14
This note analyzes the Zobel II opinion and concludes that it was cor-
rectly decided both under the two-tier analysis employed by the United
States Supreme Court and the balancing approach adopted by the Alaska
court. Since this case is before the United States Supreme Court on ap-
peal, this note urges the Court to adopt the Alaska balancing test for dura-
tional residence equal protection cases 15 as a replacement for the tradi-
tional two-tier analysis.
I. BACKGROUND OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCE EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS
In order to understand the development in durational residence equal
protection analysis that Zobel 11 represents, it is helpful to summarize the
development of equal protection analysis in both the United States and the
Alaska Supreme Courts. Equal protection analysis of challenged legisla-
tion has evolved into a two-tier test. 16 Courts apply the upper tier, strict
9. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 22, § 1 (1980) (repealed 1980). See note 2 supra.
10. ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 1 provides, in part: "[Al persons are equal and entitled to equal
rights, opportunities, and protection under the law;..."
11. 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980).
12. 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981).
13. The test is also called the Erickson test. See State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978). See
also notes 42-44 and accompanying text infra.
14. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in part: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
15. Adoption of the balancing approach for all equal protection analysis cases should be consid-
ered. An argument for this position is, however, beyond the scope of this note.
16. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CONsTuTiOr AL LAW 670-72 (10th ed. 1980).
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judicial scrutiny,' 7 when they find that the state has infringed on certain
fundamental constitutional rights18 or has used suspect classifications.' 9
Otherwise, courts apply a deferential rational relationship test.20 The ef-
fect of subjecting a challenged law to strict scrutiny is, usually, to find it
unconstitutional, 2' whereas statutes are usually upheld under the rational
relationship test. 22 It is not always clear, however, which level of scrutiny
applies in a particular case.
A. The United States Supreme Court's Durational Residence Equal
Protection Analysis
The United States Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny analysis to du-
rational residence statutes when it finds that the statute adversely affects
17. The heightened scrutiny requires two things. First, the legislation must be justified to pro-
mote a "compelling state interest." Second, the classification used must be fairly and substantially
related to the state's interest. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); G. GUN-
THER, supra note 16, at 670-72.
18. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002-10 (1978). See, e.g.. Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fundamental right to equal litigation opportunity); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental right to interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (fundamental right to vote).
19. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1012-19. See. e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (racial classification of persons of Japanese ancestry is "suspect"). The Alaska Supreme
Court held that the classification of recent interstate migration is suspect in State v. van Dort, 502
P.2d 453 (Alaska 1972). The United States Supreme Court has not followed this analysis. See, e.g..
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
Declaring that recent interstate migration is a suspect classification merely extends the problems
caused by the two-tier analysis. See notes 61-63, 111 & 112 and accompanying text infra. Also. such
a holding by the United States Supreme Court would necessitate overruling Sosna. The Alaska Su-
preme Court wisely changed its course by adopting a balancing test for durational residence equal
protection cases in Zobel I, instead of continuing its automatic application of strict scrutiny in those
cases.
20. As originally construed, the command of equal protection was that the statute must "'be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Paraphrased, the test of equal protection was only that governments must not
impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the
object of regulation." G. GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 670 (quoting Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). This deferential view is still the basis for
the rational relationship test.
21. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 67 1; L. TRIBE, supra note 18. at 1000 ("When
expressed as a standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is, in Professor Gunther's formulation.
'strict' in theory and usually 'fatal' in fact.").
22. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 671 (referring to the rational relationship test as, essen-
tially, an abdication ofjudicial authority).
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the constitutional right to travel. 23 Thus, if no adverse effect on the right
to travel is found, the state can regulate on durational residence grounds
to the extent that the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose, assuming that no other fundamental right or suspect classi-
fication is present. The Court's determination of what constitutes a suffi-
cient penalty on the right to travel to trigger strict scrutiny has passed
through three phases since 1969.
First, the Court determined that denials of certain state benefits or fun-
damental rights penalize the right to travel. In Shapiro v. Thompson,24 the
Court found that the state's denial of welfare benefits, deemed a "basic
necessity of life," 25 to new state residents was a penalty on the right to
travel, thereby triggering strict scrutiny. Subsequently, in Dunn v. Blum-
stein,26 the Court held that denying a fundamental right such as voting to
newly arrived residents also demands strict scrutiny. This holding led
some to believe that all durational residence statutes required strict scru-
tiny.27
In the next phase the Court indicated that the right to travel must be
penalized beyond a certain level before strict scrutiny is triggered. 28 In
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,29 for example, the Court held
23. The right to travel in this context means the right to travel and settle interstate. The Alaska
Supreme Court referred to this as the right to migrate. Although not explicitly in the United States
Constitution, it is generally conceded that the right to travel between the states is a fundamental
constitutional right. SeeZobell, 619 P.2d 422, 425 n.5 (Alaska 1980).
24. 394U.S. 618 (1969).
25. "[Basic necessities of life are] the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities
of life." Id. at 627.
26. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("freedom
to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitu-
tion").
27. The Court first stated in very broad language, that "[d]urational residence laws penalize
those persons who have traveled from one place to another to establish a new residence during the
qualifying period." This statement is apparently qualified in the next sentence: "Such laws...
discriminate against [new residents by] denying them the opportunity to vote." 405 U.S. at 334-35
(footnote omitted). This raises two questions: (1) whether all statutes that penalize the right to travel
trigger strict scrutiny, no matter how slight the penalty; and (2) whether all statutes that include a
durational residency requirement ipso facto penalize the right to travel. See generally Gunther, Fore-
word: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
28. The first signs of this phase appeared the year after Shapiro with the Court's summary af-
firmance of Stains v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff 'd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971), which upheld a one-year residency requirement for reduced tuition purposes. The district
court in Starns found that while the durational residence requirement involved in that case may affect
the right to travel, the effect was not a penalty that would trigger strict scrutiny. Thus statutes with
durational residence requirements do not automatically penalize the right to travel.
The Supreme Court indicated in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,452 n.9 (1973), that it continued
to approve of its affirmance of Starns. See also Zobel 11, 619 P.2d 448, 451 n.9 (Alaska 1980), prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981).
29. 415U.S.250 (1974).
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that denial of free non-emergency medical benefits to newly arrived indi-
gents required strict scrutiny. The Court noted that the impact on the right
to travel could be framed in terms of deterrence to travel as well as penal-
ties on actually travelling. 30 It did not make clear the amount of impact
required to give rise to strict scrutiny. 31 Nor did the Court define stan-
dards for determining the amount of penalty on the right to travel.
Finally, in Sosna v. Iowa,32 the Court appeared to balance the govern-
ment's interests in the residence classification against the infringement on
the right to travel, yet claimed to retain the two-tier test. The Court found
that denying access to divorce courts until residents lived in the state for
one year did not trigger strict scrutiny. In Sosna the state's interests were
sufficiently important to outweigh the interests of the individual since the
individual was not "irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of
what she sought." 33 Although the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny,
30. Id. Although the Court considered the amount of impact on the right to migrate as involving
two elements, it is helpful to note that they are not distinct concepts. The amount of penalty involved
may well give rise to or add to the deterrent effect of the statute. It is not at all clear whether a
durational residency statute could deter migration without having the threat of a penalty. A showing
of actual deterrence is not necessary to trigger strict scrutiny. Id. at 257-58.
31. The Court, in Maricopa County, stated:
Although any durational residence requirement impinges to some extent on the right to travel,
the Court in Shapiro did not declare such a requirement to be per se unconstitutional. The
Court's holding was conditioned, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21, by the caveat that some "waiting-
period or residence requirements ... may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional
right of interstate travel." The amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state-
interest test was not made clear. The Court spoke of the requisite impact in two ways. First, we
considered whether the waiting period would deter migration .... Second, the Court considered
the extent to which the residence requirement served to penalize the exercise of the right to
travel.
415 U.S. at 256-57 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
32. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). For a fuller analysis of Sosna see 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 121 (1976).
33. 419 U.S. at 406. The Court stated that "[s]he would eventually qualify for the same sort of
adjudication which she demanded virtually upon her arrival in the State. Iowa's requirement [merely]
delayed her access to the courts. ... Id. This comment spawned the attempted distinction between
delay and denial in Zobel II. See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra. The distinction is. however,
illusory. In Sosna, access to the courts at the present time was denied, just as access to welfare
payments at the present time was denied in Shapiro. Alternatively viewed, access to the courts in
Sosna is merely delayed just as access to welfare benefits in Shapiro was merely delayed.
The distinction between delay and denial is correctly demonstrated by the Sosna Court's short
discussion of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), a due process case. 419 U.S. at 410. In
Boddie, Connecticut had denied access to its divorce courts to those who could not afford to pay the
required fee. The Court struck down this scheme since it was a total denial of access to the courts. In
contrast, the Iowa plan delayed access to the courts for only a year. It is not possible to draw a clear
distinction between Sosna on the one hand and Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County on the other
based on a delay-denial notion.
The real difference is the amount of impact on the person whose right to travel is penalized or
deterred. The Court thus views the denial or delay of welfare benefits to the potential recipient as a
greater penalty on the right to travel than the denial or delay of access to the courts to the potential
divorcee.
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the review of the statute in Sosna was more rigorous 34 than the traditional
rational relationship test. 35 The apparent addition of a middle level of
scrutiny makes it difficult to determine what level of analysis the Court
will use in durational residency cases. 36
B. The Alaska Court's Equal Protection Analysis
The Alaska court initially followed the federal two-tier equal protection
analysis for claims brought under the equal protection clause of the
Alaska constitution. 37 Discontent arose with the two-tier analysis, largely
34. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found.substantial justifications behind the Iowa
divorce statute. Such justifications included the state's interest in marital status and property rights, in
avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which another state has a paramount interest, and in
minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack. 419 U.S. at 406-07. He
then balanced the amount of impact on the right to migrate, both the penalty and deterrent aspects,
and the impact on the right to access to the divorce courts against the state's justifications in enacting
the statute. Id. at 407-09. He concluded that the state justifications outweighed the constitutional
claims of Mrs. Sosna.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist examined the substantiality of the relationship between the classification
and the state's justifications:
The State's decision to exact a one-year residency requirement as a matter of policy is therefore
buttressed by a quite permissible inference that this requirement not only effectuates state sub-
stantive policy but likewise provides a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than
would a requirement of bona fide residence alone.
Id. at 408 (footnote omitted). Consequently, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
35. Justices Marshall and Brennan, in a strong dissent, noted the divergence from previous equal
protection analysis. Justice Marshall felt that:
The Court today departs sharply from the course we have followed in analyzing durational
residency requirements since Shapiro v. Thompson ...
As we have made clear in Shapiro and subsequent cases, any classification that penalizes
exercise of the constitutional right to travel is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest ...
The Court's failure to address the instant case in these terms suggests a new distaste for the
mode of analysis we have applied to this comer of equal protection law. In its stead, the Court
has employed what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test, under which the State's putative
interest in ensuring that its divorce plaintiffs establish some roots in Iowa is said to justify the
one-year residency requirement ...
The Court omits altogether what should be the first inquiry: whether the right to obtain a
divorce is of sufficient importance that its denial to recent immigrants constitutes a penalty on
interstate travel. In my view, it clearly meets that standard.
419 U.S. at 418-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
36. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
37. Although applying a two-tier structure, the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted Dunn as mak-
ing recent interstate migration a suspect classification. State v. van Dort, 502 P.2d 453, 454 (Alaska
1972) (declaring a 75-day residency requirement in order to vote unconstitutional). The court contin-
ued to apply this reasoning until Zobel I. See State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973) (holding a
one-year residency requirement for preference for state employment unconstitutional); State v.
Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974) (holding a one-year residence requirement in order to obtain a
divorce unconstitutional); Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974) (upholding a three-year
residence requirement for declaring candidacy for public office because of a compelling state inter-
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due to the notion that it results in a preordained outcome once the test to
be applied is chosen. 38 It was felt that this places too much emphasis on
the right to travel and gives no consideration to the substantive right the
statute regulates. As a result of this growing discontent, the Alaska court
explored the possibility of adopting a new approach for state equal protec-
tion analysis.
The Alaska court first tried using a more demanding replacement for
the rational relationship test, still within the two-tier structure, in Isakson
v. Rickey. 39 Explaining this heightened scrutiny, the court said that it
would "no longer hypothesize facts which would sustain otherwise ques-
tionable legislation as was the case under the traditional rational basis
standard.' 40 Tolerance of overinclusive and underinclusive classifica-
est): Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977) (declaring the "Alaska hire" law, giving one-
year residents preference for jobs in the petroleum industry, unconstitutional), rev'd on other
grounds. 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Castner v. City of Homer, 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979) (holding that
a one-year residency requirement for candidacy for city office met compelling state interest test). One
other equal protection case was heard in 1978, but the equal protection claim was not reached. Tho-
mas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
The United States Supreme Court had not, in fact, gone this far, as evidenced by Maricopa
County, where the Court recognized that some durational residence schemes might not impact the
right to travel enough to reach the threshold level necessary to trigger strict scrutiny. See notes 30 &
31 and accompanying text supra.
The Alaska Supreme Court's divergence from the United States Supreme Court's analysis is high-
lighted by the different holdings in State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974) (one-year residence
requirement in order to obtain a divorce violates the state constitution) and Sosna (one-year residency
requirement in order to obtain a divorce does not violate the United States Constitution). See Note,
Durational Residency Requirements: The Alaskan Experience, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REV. 50, 55
(1978). Compare State v. van Dort, 502 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1972) (75-day residency requirement in
order to vote is unconstitutional) with Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (upholding Arizona's
50-day residency requirement for voting) and Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (upholding the
closure of voter registration 50 days prior to the general election).
38. See, e.g., note 30 supra. The Alaska Supreme Court recognized a growing dissatisfaction
with the two-tier analysis in State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1124, 1131 n.44 (Alaska 1974):
We are not unmindful that application of the compelling state interest test has been criticized
as being outcome determinative. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1013,
31 L.Ed.2d 274, 296 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159. 177
(Alaska 1972) (Erwin, J., concurring). However, insofar as we can deduce, this criticism is only
a reflection of growing discontent with the two-tiered equal protection standard of review....
Until this discontent crystallizes into a fully developed alternative test, we choose to follow the
established two-tiered standard.
The court also said:
The [Supreme] Court may be searching for a new equal protection analysis. Justice Marshall has
tried to formulate a single basic test: "Whether there is an appropriate governmental interest
suitably furthered by the differential treatment." Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212,216 (1972).
522 P.2d at 1127 n.12.
39. 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976). See also Zobel I, 619 P.2d 448, 452 n. 12 (Alaska 1980), prob.
juris. noted, 10 S. Ct. 1344 (1981).
40. 550 P.2d at 362. See also Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706 n. 10 (Alaska
1975): "We are in agreement with the view that the Supreme Court's recent equal protection deci-
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tions was also reduced. 41 Raising the level of scrutiny at the lower tier did
not solve the problem, however, since it was still difficult to determine
when strict scrutiny was required.
Finding this unsatisfactory, the Alaska court adopted a balancing test
for state equal protection analysis in State v. Erickson,42 after first noting
that strict scrutiny with its compelling state interest test was not applica-
ble under federal analysis. The Alaska court's single balancing test takes
into account the importance of the substantive rights involved as well as
the burden on the right to travel. This test requires the state to bear the
burden, gauged by the nature of the rights involved, to show that the clas-
sification has a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate governmental
objective. 43 Where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are in-
volved, the result is essentially the same as applying strict scrutiny. 44
This balancing test was adopted for analysis of equal protection chal-
lenges to durational residence classifications in Zobel J.4
5
C. Summary
The United States Supreme Court's equal protection analysis appears
to be in a state of fiux. 46 Although the Court has not rejected the two-tier
sions have shown a tendency towards less speculative, less deferential, more intensified means-to-
end inquiry when it is applying the traditional rational basis test and we approve of this develop-
ment."
41. 550 P.2d at 362. See also Tussman & Tenbrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. Rnv. 341 (1949).
42. 574 P.2d I (Alaska 1978).
43. Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted):
Such a test will be flexible and dependent upon the importance of the rights involved. Based on
the nature of the right, a greater or lesser burden will be placed on the state to show that the
classification has a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate governmental objective. Where
fundamental rights or suspect categories are involved, the results of this test will be essentially
the same as requiring a "compelling state interest"; but, by avoiding outright categorization of
fundamental and non-fundamental rights, a more flexible, less result-oriented analysis may be
made.
... Initially, we must look to the purpose of the statute, viewing the legislation as a whole,
and the circumstances surrounding it. It must be determined that this purpose is legitimate, that
it falls within the police power of the state. Examining the means used to accomplish the legisla-
tive objectives and the reasons advanced therefore, the court must then determine whether the
means chosen substantially further the goals of the enactment. Finally, the state interest in the
chosen means must be balanced against the nature of the constitutional right involved.
It is important to note that "substantial relationship" is used in a flexible sense. If the nature of the
rights demonstrates that the state carries a minimal burden, the statute need only meet the Isakson
"rational relationship with bite" test. See Gunther, supra note 27.
44. 574P.2d at 12.
45. See note 13 supra.
46. G. GuNtHER, supra note 16, at 673.
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analysis, it may nevertheless be using a balancing approach, as evidenced
by Sosna v. Iowa. The Alaska court, recognizing the inherent limitations
of the two-tier approach, has explicitly adopted a balancing approach in
testing state equal protection claims.
II. THE ZOBEL H COURT'S REASONING
In Zobel 11, the Alaska court analyzed the income distribution statute47
in two steps. First, recognizing that the act would have to pass federal
constitutional muster, the act was tested under the federal two-tier analy-
sis. Then the court tested the act under Alaska constitutional law using the
balancing test.
A. The Federal Equal Protection Claim
Chief Justice Rabinowitz, writing for the plurality, noted that the
United States Supreme Court had not applied strict scrutiny to all dura-
tional residence laws. 48 He derived from prior United States Supreme
Court cases four possible "distinguishing factors" 4 9 to indicate whether
47. It is essential to understand exactly what the statute professes to accomplish. First, the statute
recognizes the equitable ownership of the state's natural resources in each state resident. Alaska Sess.
Laws ch. 21, § l(c) (1980). Second, it recognizes the depletion of the natural energy resources, oil
and gas, and the concomitant reduction in value of this equitable ownership. Alaska Sess. Laws ch.
21, § l(b)(1) (1980). Third, it recognizes the legitimate state purpose of compensating the state's
residents on an equal basis for this loss in value through the distribution of moneys derived from the
exploitation of these resources. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21, § l(b)(l) (1980).
The state of Alaska could not give each resident his or her share of the permanent fund because of
state constitutional limitations. See note 3 supra. The state is apparently trying, through the distribu-
tion statute, to provide the income from this money that would otherwise be given outright to its
residents on a yearly basis. Each year the resident remains in the state, he or she is awarded the right
to receive the income from his or her share of that year's loss in value of natural resource ownership.
Long-term residents would, of course, have accrued more rights to yearly income distributions. But
this is no different from giving the principal to each resident every year and letting them invest it as
they choose, a program that would raise no equal protection problems as long as each resident re-
ceived the same amount of principal.
The court probably chose not to interpret the statute this way for three reasons. First, the argument
was not set forth in the state's brief. Second, this interpretation could be seen as a convenient way of
depriving the appellees of a federal right by evading the constitutional issue. See Williams v. Geor-
gia, 349 U.S. 375, 399 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting). Third, the distribution scheme does not fit this
"trust" theory perfectly. For example, the "principal" on which the "dividend" is paid should
fluctuate each year with the amount of oil revenues received that year and the number of Alaskan
residents. The scheme's effect on Alaskans under the age of 18 is also disturbing. Why should they
receive no dividends if they are equitable owners? And why do they suddenly receive 18 dividends
when they reach 18 years of age if they are not equitable owners until their 18th birthday? See also
Zobel 11, 619 P.2d 448, 464 n. 1 (Alaska 1980) (Burke, J., concurring), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct.
1344 (1981).
48. 619 P.2d at 455. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
49. 619 P.2d at 454-57.
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there was sufficient impact on the right to travel to trigger strict scrutiny.
These factors consisted of, first, whether the residency requirement is
based solely on administrative, budgetary, or record-keeping considera-
tions; second, whether the benefit denied by the state is a "basic neces-
sity;"' 50 third, whether the state absolutely denies a benefit, rather than
merely delays its receipt;51 and fourth, whether the state denies a "funda-
mental right" 52 such as voting. Each of these factors alone is sufficient to
require strict scrutiny.
The court then analyzed the income distribution statute under each of
these factors and concluded that strict scrutiny was not required. Thus,
the applicable federal standard was the rational relationship test. Since the
Alaska balancing test is stricter at the lower level than the federal analy-
sis, the court reasoned that if the act withstood state equal protection anal-
ysis, it would likewise meet the federal test.
B. State Equal Protection Analysis Under the Balancing Test
The Zobel I court noted that the nature and extent of the infringement
on the right to travel in this case could not be characterized as a penalty
since even new residents received a dividend payment. Further, the court
could not see how the statute could exert a deterrent effect on that right. 53
Thus, the court felt that any impact on the right to travel arising from the
fact that the payment to a new resident was not as large as that realized by
a long-term resident should be regarded as de minimis. 54
The statute's purposes were: (1) to provide for the equitable distribu-
tion of at least a portion of the state's energy wealth; (2) to reduce popula-
tion turnover in the state; and (3) to encourage increased awareness and
involvement by the state's residents in the management of the permanent
fund. 55 The court found that these purposes were legitimate and that the
50. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
51. See generally Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (delay of right does not trigger strict
scrutiny); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (denial of right triggers strict scrutiny). See
also note 33 supra and text accompanying notes 70-73 infra.
52. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (denial of the right to vote, a fundamental
right, triggers strict scrutiny).
53. 619P.2dat458.
54. Id.
55. The state's purposes listed in the statute were:
(1) to provide a mechanism for equitable distribution to the people of Alaska of at least a
portion of the state's energy wealth derived from the development and production of the natural
resources belonging to them as Alaskans;
(2) to encourage persons to maintain their residence in Alaska and to reduce population turn-
over in the state; and
(3) to encourage increased awareness and involvement by the residents of the state in the
management and expenditure of the Alaska permanent fund (art. IX, sec. 15, state constitution).
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21, § 1 (1980).
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classification was substantially related to each purpose. 56 Finally, declar-
ing that the act did not deny equal protection of the law under the state
constitution, and hence the federal constitution, the court held that the
state's interests in using this particular means of furthering its objectives
outweighed the minimal impact on the Zobels' rights. 57
C. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
The Chief Justice spoke only for himself and one other justice out of
the five justices who heard the case. The concurring justice, while dis-
turbed with the prudence of adopting the dividend statute, agreed with the
Chief Justice's result since he felt that the statute was subject only to re-
view for arbitrariness. 58 The dissenting justices, on the other hand, felt
that the statute could not be upheld under either the Alaska or the United
States equal protection clauses. They set out two reasons for their conclu-
sion: first, that the state could not impose an unlimited durational resi-
dency requirement; and second, that the state could not reward residents
for past contributions when determining equitable distribution of the
fund. 59
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ZOBEL H PLURALITY OPINION
The Zobel H opinion demonstrates both the confusion in the present
posture of federal equal protection analysis and the advantages of the bal-
ancing approach. As already noted, the United States Supreme Court has
56. 619 P.2d at458-64.
57. Id. at464.
58. Id. at 464-65.
59. The two dissenting justices claimed that the United States Supreme Court mandated an abso-
lute limit in length of residency restrictions. 619 P.2d at 466 (Dimond, J., and Matthews. J., dissent-
ing). See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Warren. C.J., and Harlan,
J., dissenting). None of these cases cited by the minority, however, are on point. They point instead
to a requirement of reasonableness in length of residency restrictions which is derived from the stat-
ute's effect on the right to travel. Justice Stewart's dicta in Vlandis, relied upon by the dissenting
justices in Zobel II, cannot be read as creating a requirement of reasonableness without reference to
the effect on the right to travel since Vlandis was decided on due process grounds. Chief Justice
Warren's dissent in Shapiro tied the determination of reasonableness to the impact on the right to
travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 644-55 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger, dissenting in Dunn, merely felt that the penalty on the right to travel imposed by the denial of
voting rights for a year was allowable since similar penalties are imposed on the young by the denial
of voting rights until age 18. Since the limit on the length of residency restrictions is determined with
reference to the statute's effect on the right to travel, the limit is already considered in both the two-
tier and balancing analysis. The requirement of reasonableness in constitutional analysis cannot exist
in the abstract, as Chief Justice Warren recognized in Shapiro, and therefore need not be considered
further.
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not made it clear when a statute will be tested using strict scrutiny. 60
Under the traditional two-tier analysis, virtually the only way a court can
declare a statute unconstitutional is to apply strict scrutiny. To do this,
courts have at times found that the right to travel has been deterred or
penalized when it would seem that, in fact, it was not.61 This artificial
analysis leads to judicial and legislative confusion since it is not clear
which of the two tests will be applied. 62 The balancing approach is not
susceptible to this confusion. 63
This section analyzes the Zobel H court's opinion 64 and concludes that
the case was correctly decided. It also indicates some weaknesses the
Alaska court did not address in its federal equal protection analysis, as
well as weaknesses in the court's application of the balancing test. None
of these faults, however, affect the outcome. This note argues that the
balancing approach provides a more analytically sound and less artificial
analysis than the federal approach. It concludes that, under either analy-
sis, the Zobels' equal protection claim must be dismissed.
60. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra.
61. The finding of deterrence does not require a finding of actual deterrence. Thus, a statute may
be struck down on the basis of speculative deterrence. The wisdom of such a doctrine is questionable.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 650-51 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
62. See note 37 supra.
63. Rather than trying to determine what test to apply, the courts will focus on what should be the
outcome of the case. Admittedly, it will at first be unclear how much weight should be given different
non-fundamental rights. This will eventually be cleared up by precedent-indeed, already existing
case law provides a somewhat adequate roadmap, as the discussion of the Zobels' rights demon-
strates. See notes 82-89 and accompanying text infra.
64. The Alaska permanent fund income distribution statute poses a new problem for equal pro-
tection analysis that is not fully developed in the Zobel 11 opinion. See 619 P.2d at 454 n. 19. In all
prior cases dealing with classifications based on the length of residency in a state-Sosna, Dunn,
Shapiro and Maricopa County-residents were denied outright a state benefit for a set period of time.
After that time had elapsed, all residents were treated equally. The dividend statute, however, never
completely denies benefits to newcomers. See text accompanying note 8 supra. There is, however,
no set period of time after which all residents reach parity. Arguably, this statute does not penalize
the exercise of recent interstate migration, nor does it act as a deterrent on that right. But see note 95
infra. Contrast the statute that was invalidated in Zobel I-there the new resident bore the entire
burden while the longer term resident reaped the entire benefit. The purpose and function of the
permanent fund income distribution statute is to provide an incentive to residents to remain in the
state and to reward those who have remained. The purpose and function of the statutes involved in
Dunn, Shapiro, Maricopa County, and Zobel I was to penalize people moving into the state.
The classification in Zobel II is not "recent interstate migration" as in Dunn, Shapiro and Mari-
copa County, so perhaps prior United States Supreme Court analysis, including the right to travel
analysis, is inapplicable. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974),
where the Court inferred that if recent interstate migration was the basis for the classification, then the
compelling state interest test was applicable. See also note 30 supra. The Alaska court held, how-
ever, that the classification in Zobel II was to be assessed by the same principles and criteria as the
"recent interstate migration" classification. 619 P.2d at 454 n. 19.
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A. The Court's Analysis of the Federal Equal Protection Claim
Using the federal two-tier analysis, two questions are raised: (I)
whether strict scrutiny or rational relationship analysis is applicable;65
and (2) whether the challenged statute meets the chosen standard. There
are two steps to answering the first question. First the court must deter-
mine if there is any impact on the right to travel. If an impact is found, the
court must determine if the impact is enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
The Zobel II court explicitly examined the effect of the statute on the
constitutional right to travel, both for deterrent and penalizing effect, and
concluded that the impact was, at most, de minimis. 66 Rather than auto-
matically applying the lower tier of the federal standard, however, the
court went on to examine its four "distinguishing factors" 67 to determine
whether strict scrutiny was triggered. Arguably, the Alaska court did not
need to go this far. Since the court determined that there was de minimis
impact, there apparently was no need to examine whether strict scrutiny
would apply. Strict scrutiny is applicable only when there is measurable
penalty or imaginable deterrence.
Even if there is an impact on the right to travel, the Alaska court's
choice of indicia as to whether strict scrutiny is required is faulty. Only
two of the factors the court cites, the "basic necessity of life" 68 and
"fundamental right" 69 distinctions, have merit in determining when fed-
eral analysis requires strict scrutiny. Since the permanent fund dividends
do not fall into either category, strict scrutiny is not triggered.
65. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra.
66. The court found that:
Examination of the nature and extent of the infringement of the constitutional right involved
has led us to conclude that this legislative scheme cannot be said to "penalize" the fight of
interstate migration .... The new resident does, in fact, receive financial gain for exercising his
or her right to move into Alaska; and whatever "penalty" may accrue from the fact that this gain
is not as large as that realized by a long-term resident we regard as de minimis.
In making this judgment, we are aware of the statements by the United States Supreme Court
that a showing of "deterrence" is not necessary to a finding of an infringement upon the right to
migrate; but it is also true that the Court has consistently relied upon the severity of the penalty
inflicted upon the individual for exercising the fight of interstate migration in reaching its results
in various cases. In our view the permanent fund earnings distribution statute can only be char-
acterized as a penalty with great awkwardness. We are therefore convinced that the exercise of
the right of interstate migration is not penalized by the statute in question.
619 P.2d at 457-58 (footnote omitted).
67. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 25 supra.
69. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Impact on a fundamental right would
presumably trigger strict scrutiny even without the impact on the right to travel. If delaying access to
a divorce court does not impact a fundamental fight, it appears that allocating the receipt of non-vital
governmental benefits based on years of residency would also not impact a fundamental right. See
Sosna v. Iowa. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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The court's choice of the delay-denial distinction70 as an indicator is
inappropriate for durational residence cases. 71 The importa.nt question is
not whether there is a delay or a denial, but rather the extent of the stat-
ute's impact on the right to travel caused by the delay or denial. 72 Since
here the impact is slight,73 the court properly found that strict scrutiny
should not be applied.
The fourth factor the Zobel II court identified, that the justifications put
forth by the state must go beyond budgetary, recordkeeping, and adminis-
trative concerns, 74 was misplaced. This factor is relevant only in deter-
mining the state's interests in the legislation after the court has deter-
mined what level, of scrutiny to apply. 75 The factor is of no help in
determining which level of scrutiny the court is to use and should be re-
jected as an indicium of strict scrutiny.
Under the two-tier method, the rational relationship test was the proper
test to apply since any impact caused by the statute does not reach the
threshold level to trigger strict scrutiny. 76 The court, upon reaching this
conclusion, stated that the rational relationship test would be met a for-
tiori if the state's purposes and the relationship between the means and
ends met the state balancing test. 77 The Alaska court thus held that the
balancing test applied a stricter scrutiny than the United States Supreme
Court's rational relationship test. 78
B. The State Equal Protection Balancing Test
Since the Zobel II court had to apply both the federal two-tier analysis
as well as the state balancing test, this case provides an excellent contrast
between the two approaches. In two-tier analysis, the determinative issue
is what standard of review will be applied. In a balancing analysis, the
issue is two-fold: first, whether the state can meet its burden, measured by
the importance of and impact on the rights involved, 79 to show that the
70. Seenote51 supra.
71. See note 33 supra.
72. See note 33 supra.
73. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text infra.
74. 619 P.2d at 455.
75. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra.
76. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
77. 619 P.2d at 457. Given the higher level of Justice Rehnquist's judicial scrutiny under the
rational relationship test in Sosna, see note 34 supra, the Alaska Supreme Court's holding that the
lower tier's scrutiny is less than that reached by the state balancing test may not be warranted. It
appears, nevertheless, that both tests are applied with equal scrutiny, so that if the statute survives the
Erickson balancing test, it also survives the Sosna version of the rational relationship test.
78. 619 P.2d at 457.
79. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978). See note 43 supra.
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purposes of the statute are legitimate and that the means chosen substan-
tially further those purposes; 80 and second, whether the state's interests in
the particular means chosen outweigh the nature and impact on the indi-
vidual rights involved. 8'
1. Examination of the Zobels' Rights
An examination of the statute's effect on the rights must include an
examination of the effect on both the right to travel and the substantive
right the statute regulates. An examination of the effect on the right to
travel involves two steps: a determination as to whether an impact is pres-
ent and, if so, a determination of how substantial the impact is.
The Alaska court's view that the impact on the right to travel was slight
in this case is supported by United States Supreme Court precedent. The
Supreme Court cases indicate that there is a certain minimum level of
governmental benefits that cannot be withheld solely because of length of
residency. 82 This "core" of services and benefits includes those vital ser-
vices and benefits such as the right of indigents to medical care in Mari-
copa Count),83 as well as the non-vital services such as schools, parks,
and libraries mentioned in Shapiro.84 In Zobel II, the dividends are a non-
vital monetary benefit which is not completely denied to the new resident.
The literal sense of the word "penalty" is simply inapplicable to the
Alaska statute's effect on the short-term resident. It would be likewise
difficult to suggest that the statute would deter anyone from moving into
80. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978). See note 43 supra.
8 1. State v, Erickson, 574 P.2d 1. 12 (Alaska 1978). See note 43 supra.
82. In Shapiro the Supreme Court said that the equal protection clause prohibits apportionment
of state benefits and services, such as schools, parks, libraries, and police and fire protection, on the
basis of past tax contributions. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618. 632-33 (1969). In Maricopa
County the Court said that the right of interstate travel insures new residents the same right to vital
governmental benefits and privileges as are enjoyed by other residents. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 261 (1974). See generally National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). In User the Court said that schools, hospitals, police and fire protection each provide "an
integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have
traditionally afforded their citizens." Id. at 855 (footnote omitted).
83. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261 (1974).
84. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969). It is worthwhile to note that these
"core" benefits and services are merely what one would expect to receive upon moving into any
state. This argument is supported by the Court's affirmance of Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234
(D. Minn. 1970). aff 'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). The Court upheld the one-year residency re-
quirement in Starns for lower state university tuition and, indeed, most people expect that they would
have to pay nonresident tuition immediately upon moving into the state. The Court again noted its
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the state. 85 Thus the Alaska court was correct in finding that the impact on
the right to travel was slight.
The Zobel II court did not explicitly consider the substantive right in-
volved, which is the right to receive non-vital monetary benefits. 86 Where
more substantial rights are involved, the balancing test serves to protect
those rights from discriminatory government action. The Alaska court's
failure to address the substantive right in Zobel II was not a fatal error
because of the minimal importance of the substantive right. 87 The Su-
preme Court held, in Dandridge v. Williams,88 that a state's denial of
equal per capita welfare payments to large and small families does not, by
itself, trigger strict scrutiny and that such a denial is permissible under the
rationality standard. Since the denial in Zobel H involved non-vital bene-
fits, it cannot be deemed more significant than the denial in Dandridge.
Given the extent of the Zobels' rights, the state's burden to show that
the classification bears a fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate
governmental objective is not great. Indeed, prior United States Supreme
Court decisions indicate that when the statute's impact on the right to
travel is slight, and where the substantive right regulated is not signifi-
cant, the state's burden requires little more than a showing of a rational
basis. 89 Where more substantial rights are present, the state would bear a
heavier burden.
85. Perhaps the right to travel analysis is inapplicable in this case. See note 64 supra. Providing
incentives to residents to keep them from leaving the state has never been held to be a burden on the
right of interstate travel. See note 95 infra. Also compare the statute invalidated in Zobel . In Zobel I
the new resident received no benefit and bore the entire burden of tax liability. In contrast, under the
dividend statute, the new resident simply does not receive as great a benefit as the longer term resi-
dent. See note 64 supra.
86. See Zobel H, 619 P.2d at 458. But see Zobel 11, 619 P.2d at 463 (noting that the court is
dealing with a law providing for governmental payments which "is entitled to a strong presumption
of constitutionality" (quoting Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978)) and indicating that the
Alaska court implicitly considered the underlying right involved).
87. See note 64 supra.
88. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriquez, the Court examined the substantive right involved, the right to equal
quality of state education as measured by state expenditures, to see if it was afforded explicit or
implicit protection under the Federal Constitution. Finding no such protection, and, additionally, no
close nexus to another constitutionally protected right, such as the right to migrate or to vote, the
Court refused to apply strict scrutiny. Upon application of the rational relationship test, the state
expenditures were upheld. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Douglas, dissenters in Dandridge, were
joined by Justice White in dissent in Rodriquez.
89. In some respects, then, the balancing approach can be seen less as an abandonment of two-
tier analysis than a refocusing of the analysis to include several years of precedent. At least two
Justices on the Court, Marshall and White, recognize that the Court has applied a "spectrum of
standards." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring). This note empha-
sizes the need to legitimize the precedent by reevaluating the critical factors that weighed in these
cases, rather than focusing only on the rights involved. In Zobel H, the critical factor is that the
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2. Examination of the State's Interests and the Means Used to Further
Them
Under the balancing test, after the statute's impact has been assessed,
the state's interests in the particular statute must be examined. 90 This
again involves a two-step determination: 9' first, the purpose of the statute
must be legitimate; and second, the classification scheme must substan-
tially further the purpose.
The first listed purpose of the Alaska act is equitable distribution of part
of the state's energy wealth, 92 a permissible state goal. Underlying this
purpose, the court found a desire to reward residents based on past tangi-
ble and intangible contributions to the state's culture and com-
monwealth. 93 Analyzing the legitimacy of this underlying desire, the
court recognized certain problems unique to the state of Alaska and its
residents. These problems include the high cost of living, the harsh cli-
mate, and the fact that many people come to Alaska to derive great finan-
cial gain and then leave to enjoy the fruits of their labor elsewhere, result-
ing in a great drain of financial and other resources from the state. 94 The
court felt that this underlying purpose was legitimate, reasoning that if
states may constitutionally charge university students different tuition
rates based on past tax contributions, 95 a state may likewise reward resi-
benefit involved is not a "core" governmental benefit. See notes 83 & 84 and accompanying text
supra. See also note 43 supra.
90. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978). See note 43 supra.
91. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978). See note 43 supra.
92. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21, § 1 (1980). See note 55 supra.
93. 619 P.2d at 458.
94. The Alaska Supreme Court cites several studies documenting this claim. See Zobel H, 619
P.2d at 459 n.33.
95. 619 P.2d at 460. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff 'd mem.,
401 U.S. 985 (1971), cited with approval in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 n.9 (1973). See
also Reeves, Inc. v. State, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state may restrict sales of cement from state owned
plant to only state residents because they fund the state treasury).
There remains the question whether all states should be allowed to distinguish between their resi-
dents on the basis of their length of residency in providing "non-core" benefits and services based on
any legitimate state purpose. It is possible that any state could put forth equitable distribution based
on past intangible contributions as a legitimate state purpose. One may question, however, whether
Alaska's special problems present more substantial state interests.
If all states could differentiate between their residents in providing "non-core" benefits and ser-
vices, all states could initiate such programs rewarding their long-term residents. As short-term resi-
dents "built up" their residency payments the effect of their moving to another state and having to
start all over again, thereby suffering a financial loss, would be a severe deterrent. What could con-
ceivably result, then, would be pockets of long-term residents in each state and severely constrained
interstate migration.
The court dealt with this issue by raising three points. First, this issue was not argued by the
challengers. Second, if it had been, the challengers would probably have lacked standing to complain
since they had not alleged a desire to leave. Such an argument by one wanting to leave or who
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dents for other past contributions. 96 Noting that the fit between means and
ends need not be perfect since the state's burden is not great, 97 the court
determined that the classification sufficiently furthered this equitable dis-
tribution so as to tip the scales in favor of constitutionality.
The second listed purpose of the statute is to encourage Alaskan resi-
dency and to remedy the persistent problem of population turnover.98
This is a legitimate state goal because it furthers the state's economic in-
terest in stabilizing its economy. 99 Rewarding residents with monetary
benefits clearly furthers this state goal, 100 as does the underlying promise
of future increasing benefits. 101 Thus a court could find that the distribu-
tion plan substantially furthers the goal of providing incentives to main-
tain state residency even though the benefit to some is small.
The third state purpose is to encourage increased awareness and in-
volvement by the residents of the state in the management and expendi-
ture of the Alaska permanent fund. 102 The court viewed increased citizen
awareness and involvement as a means of insuring the prudent manage-
ment of the fund, as well as the state's natural resources, so that the fund
would produce income for future years. Giving residents a direct mone-
tary interest in the fund furthers this goal. Since state legislators serve as a
conduit between the residents' desires and the management of the fund, it
could be argued that the chain is somewhat weak. But since the only way
left is seemingly foreclosed by the Court's holding in Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per
curiam). The Court, in denying that a social security recipient was entitled to benefits upon moving to
Puerto Rico, even though he had been receiving them in Connecticut, said that the right to travel
doctrine did not require a state to continue to pay benefits, that were provided for its residents indefi-
nitely, to any person who had once resided there. Id. at 4.
Third, the "loss" involved in this circumstance would stem not from the durational residency link,
but rather from the simple residence requirement, and would thus be subject to a completely different
analysis. Zobel 11, 619 P.2d at 461 n.36. The relevant analysis would be under the privileges and
immunities clause.
96. But see Zobel I, 619 P.2d at 429 (holding that the state could not apportion the tax burden to
residents on the basis of past tax contributions, citing Shapiro as support).
97. See note 43 supra. The Alaska court claimed there was an absence of preferable alternatives.
The discussion of preferable alternatives was raised too early by the court in its analysis. Alternatives
should be discussed in connection with the state's interests in the particular classification system
which is the last part of the balancing test. See notes 104-110 and accompanying text infra.
98. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21, § 1 (1980). See note 55 supra.
99. Encouraging residency would stem the outflow of the state's resources. See text accompany-
ing note 94 supra. This is a good argument for consideration of the state's special problems since it
supports a finding that this is not just some theory made up to justify invidious discrimination. See
Zobellf, 619 P.2d at 459 n.33.
100. Per capita distribution might accomplish the same thing. But per capita distribution could be
viewed by residents as merely a cost of living allowance whereas yearly increasing benefits would
create additional incentive to stay. In any event, this analysis should have been left to the last part of
the balancing test. See notes 104-110 and accompanying text infra.
101. Each year the resident's benefit increases. See notes 1-7 and accompanying text supra.
102. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21, § 1 (1980). See note 55 supra.
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for residents to participate in the fund's management is through their leg-
islators, the direct cash benefit works to further this legitimate goal. 103
3. Balancing the Alternative Means Against the Zobels' Rights
After the rights have been assessed, the state's purposes found legiti-
mate, and the classification system sufficiently related to the purposes,
the court balances the state's interest in using the particular means against
the nature of the constitutional rights involved. 104 This part of the analysis
should involve a balance, based on the nature of and impact on the rights
involved,105 between the dividend statute's classification and possible al-
ternatives the state might have employed to accomplish the statute's pur-
poses. 106
The Zobel H court found that there were no reasonable alternatives to
the state's distribution plan. In its determination that the dividend statute
substantially furthered the first state purpose, the court found that there
were no clearly preferable alternatives to the dividend statute for reward-
ing past contributions. 107 Similarly, as to the third purpose, the court
found that per capita distribution was not a preferable alternative,108 al-
though the dissent disagreed. But taking the three state purposes together,
there are no clear preferable alternatives, 09 particularly when measured
against the minimal impact on the right to travel and the significance of
the substantive right regulated. 110
103. Per capita distribution would result in the dilution of individuals' shares as population in-
creased. The court claimed that constituents would thus pressure state representatives to provide for
the highest possible percentage return on the permanent fund principal investments. This would re-
quire riskier investments. A parallel argument was made for the management of the state's resources
from which the fund is increased. This analysis should have been left to the last part of the balancing
test. See notes 104-110 and accompanying text infra.
104. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978). See note 43 supra.
105. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978). See note 43 supra. For an analysis of the
Zobels' rights, see notes 82-89 and accompanying text supra.
106. The court, in ZobelH, did not explicitly engage in this balancing. Indeed, the opinion could
be read as adopting an ad hoc balancing of the Zobels' rights and the state's interests. See Zobel II,
619 P.2d at 457 n.30. This is not the mandate of Erickson. See note 43 supra.
107. See note 97 supra.
108. See note 103 supra.
109. See notes 97 & 103 supra.
110. Where, as here, a close case of constitutionality is presented, the presumption of constitu-
tionality in favor of statutes providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits will tip the
scale. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam) (law providing for governmental payments
of monetary benefits is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality). It should be noted that
this presumption is substantially weakened when there is evidence of discriminatory intent, as indeed
there may be here. See Brief for Appellee at 18 & 19, Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska
1980), probjuris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981).
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4. Summary
In summary, although the court did not apply the balancing test exactly
as it was originally formulated, the outcome was proper. This area of
constitutional law is particularly murky. Each new proposal for analysis
should be set out clearly and followed rigorously. Otherwise the new pro-
posal does little to provide guidance to the courts and legislatures. Thus it
is suggested that in the future the Alaska court follow its equal protection
analysis more diligently. The court's application of federal two-tier anal-
ysis is not subject to the same criticism, however, since the present pos-
ture of that analysis is not clear.
IV. PROPOSAL
It is time for the United States Supreme Court to explicitly adopt a
balancing approach to durational residence equal protection analysis, if
not for all equal protection cases. The two-tier analysis is no longer work-
able after the recognition, in Maricopa County, that there are levels of
impact on the right to travel."1' It is impossible to draw a line, based on
the notion of a threshold amount of impact on the right to travel, where
rational relationship scrutiny ends and strict scrutiny begins. Even if such
a line could be drawn, it would be illcgical to apply a highly deferential
test if the statute's penalty almost reached the threshold but a rigorous
strict scrutiny test if the impact is found to be just over the threshold. In
contrast, the balancing test does not draw these artificial lines.
Furthermore, the two-tier approach ignores the importance of the sub-
stantive right the statute regulates. The right of equal protection of the
law, in cases where the right to travel is not heavily impacted, may war-
rant more than rationality review, as recognized in Sosna. The balancing
test allows increased scrutiny for rights that the Court has deemed more
weighty yet has not protected by strict judicial review.
The criticisms of the balancing approach may well rest on the ad hoc
nature of the test. The two-tier test, though, cannot be defended on this
ground since it is ad hoe in its application. In order to strike down a stat-
ute under the two-tier approach, the Court must, essentially, find that the
denial of the substantive right impacts the right to travel sufficiently to
trigger strict scrutiny. This leads, at times, to an artificial analysis 12 that
causes legislative and judicial confusion. The balancing approach pro-
vides a more consistent doctrine because it does not require artificial de-
terminations of impact to justify greater judicial scrutiny. Through Su-
111. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
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preme Court precedent already set out, as well as future interpretations,
much of the ad hoc nature of the balancing approach can be alleviated.
The Zobel II appeal presents an opportunity for the United States Su-
preme Court to explicitly adopt a balancing approach. This test examines
the nature and the importance of the rights involved, then determines
whether the asserted purposes of the statute are permissible and legiti-
mate, and whether the means chosen substantially further the statutory
goals. Finally, the state's interest in the chosen means is balanced against
the nature of and impact on the rights involved.
V. CONCLUSION
The Alaska court correctly decided Zobel II using both the federal two-
tier analysis as it currently exists and the balancing test. Under federal
analysis, strict scrutiny is not triggered, and the statute certainly passes
the rational relationship test. The statute was also validated under the bal-
ancing test. Since the right to travel was not substantially impacted, and
since the substantive right that the statute regulates was not of great sig-
nificance, the state met its minimal burden of demonstrating a legitimate
state interest in the statute. Likewise, the state met its burden of showing
that the means selected by the legislature substantially further the state's
goals. Finally, on balance, the state's interest in the chosen means out-
weighs the Zobels' rights.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court should adopt the balanc-
ing approach, and uphold the statute. The two-tier analysis is no longer
tenable as it is confusing and places too much emphasis on the right to
travel at the expense of other substantive rights. 113
E. Thaddeus Lewis
113. The author expresses no opinion as to the wisdom in enacting the permanent fund income
distribution statute. Having decided that the statute does not create a suspect classification, see note
19 supra, or affect a fundamental right, see section III.B. 1. supra, "the judiciary may not sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas
that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines .... - New Orleans v. Dukes.
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
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